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By David L. Hefflinger*

Proposed Rule Broadens
Scope of Judicial Notice
1. ROLE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
The traditional notion that trials involve a judge and a jury has
had a profound impact on the development of doctrines relating
to judicial notice. The existence of the jury has created a demand
for guarantees of accuracy. Facts in dispute are generally established by the jury after the controlled introduction of formal evidence. However, proving facts with evidence takes time and effort; noticing facts is simpler, easier and more convenient. The
objectives of the evidentiary rules may sometimes be accomplished
by taking judicial notice. On numerous occasions, therefore, judges
have taken a question of fact and excused the party having the
burden of establishing the fact from the necessity of producing formal proof. The recognition by a court that certain facts are true
without the production of evidence constitutes the substance of judicial notice.
Professor McCormick has stated that formal evidence is not
needed when: (1) the fact in question is known immediately by
reasonable men without going to other sources of information; or
(2) the fact in question is not immediately known by reasonable
men but they agree that the fact is verifiable by going to other
sources.' Under (1), judicial notice may be taken of -facts which
may be regarded as forming part of the knowledge of every person
of ordinary understanding and intelligence. 2 Under (2), judicial
notice may be taken of facts capable of immediate and accurate
demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable
accuracy.8
*

B.A. cum laude 1969 and J$D. summa cum laude 1972, Creighton Uni-

versity. Member Omaha, Nebraska and American Bar Associations.
1. C. McComwcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW or EvIDNCE § 323 (lst ed.
1954).
2. In re Estate of Bose, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N.W. 319 (1939).
3. State ex rel. Johnson v. Wagner, 139 Neb. 471, 297 N.W. 906 (1941).
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Applying these general rules, courts have judicially noticed that
electric wires carry deadly currents, 4 the normal period of gestation is two hundred eighty days, 5 whiskey and beer are intoxicating6 and blood tests to disprove paternity are scientifically accurate.7 Judicial notice has also been taken with respect to history,s
distances 9 and geographic facts. 10
II.

PROBLEM AREAS

The few examples cited above indicate that courts have utilized
judicial notice in a variety of fact situations. In developing a codification of the system and in determining the procedural aspects
to be followed, courts and writers alike have encountered several
problem areas.
A. Adjudicative and Legislative Facts
Adjudicative facts are simply the facts in a particular case as
applied to the parties involved. Legislative facts, on the other
hand, are facts which inform the tribunal's legislative judgment
in developing law or policy. Professor Kenneth Davis has defined
adjudicative facts as follows:
When a court or an agency finds facts concerning the immediate
parties-who did what, where, when, how, and with what motive
or intent-the court or agency is performing an adjudicative function and the facts are conveniently called adjudicative facts....
Stated in other terms, the adjudicative facts are those to which
the law is applied in the process of adjudication. They are the
facts that normally go to the jury in a jury case. They relate
to the parties, their activities, their properties, their businesses."

With respect to legislative facts, Professor McCormick has written:
It is conventional wisdom to observe that judges not only are
charged to find what the law is but must regularly make new
law when deciding upon the constitutional validity of a statute,
interpreting a statute, or extending or restricting a common law
rule. The very nature of the judicial process necessitates that
4. Johnson v. New Omaha Thompson-Houston Elec. Light Co., 78 Neb.
27, 113 N.W. 526 (1907), affg on rehearing 78 Neb. 24 (1907).
5. Koepke v. Dells, 95 Neb. 619, 146 N.W. 962 (1914).
6. Peterson v. State, 63 Neb. 251, 88 N.W. 549 (1901).
7. Houghton v. Houghton, 179 Neb. 275, 137 N.W.2d 861 (1965).
8. J.K. Armsby Co. v. Raymond Bros.-Clarke Co., 90 Neb. 553, 134 N.W.
174 (1912) (general depression of 1908).
9. Gorman v. Dalgas, 151 Neb. 1, 36 N.W.2d 561 (1949) (city block ordinarily three hundred feet long).
10. Grosc v. Bredthauer, 136 Neb. 43, 284 N.W. 869 (1939) (city of Waterloo situated within Douglas County, Nebraska).
11. 2 K. DAvis, AD1 NYsTRA r LAW § 15.03 (1958).
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judges be guided, as legislators are, by considerations of expediency and public policy. They must in the nature of things act
either upon knowledge already possessed or upon assumptions or
upon investigation of the pertinent general facts, social, economic,
political, or scientific. An older tradition once prescribed that
judges should rationalize their result solely in terms of analogy
to old doctrines leaving the considerations of expediency unstated.
Contemporary practice indicates that judges in their opinions
should render explicit the factual grounds therefor. These latter
have been helpfully classed as "legislative facts," as contrasted
with the "adjudicative facts" which are historical facts pertaining
to the incidents which give rise to lawsuits.12

Generally, adjudicative facts must be supported by evidence and
resolved by the trier of fact; legislative facts need not and often
cannot be supported by evidence. For this reason, legislative facts

are alternatively called "extra-record facts." Well known examples of a court's use of legislative facts are Brown v. Board of
Education 3 in which the United States Supreme Court noticed
that segregation of the races in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon black children, and Dennis v. United States 4 in which
the Court noticed the ascendency of Communist doctrines.
The distinction between adjudicative facts and legislative facts
is important when attempts are made to codify the law of judicial
notice. Because legislative facts are seldom indisputable, and adjudicative facts may or may not be disputable, a codified system
of judicial notice based on indisputable facts would seem to require
the exclusion of legislative facts. In addition, the process by which
a judge notices legislative facts may not be an appropriate subject
for codified judicial notice treatment. 5 Attempted codifications of
judicial notice of adjudicative facts have been successful, but a
viable formulation of rules concerning legislatve facts has not
proved feasible. Professor McCormick notes the following trend:
[There are indications] that the doctrine of judicial notice may
ultimately be reduced to a workable consensus. Current trends
would indicate that this consensus will, if it comes to fruition, in-

12. C. McCoRMIcK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EvnENCE § 331 (2d ed.
1972) [hereinafter cited as McCoRmIcK]. See B. CARDoZo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIL PROCESS 113-25 (1921); Davis, Judicial Notice,

55 COLUm. L. REv. 945, 952 (1955).
13. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
14. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
15. Morgan, JudicialNotice, 57 HARv. L. REv. 269 (1944). Professor Davis
disagrees, arguing that the right to be heard in opposition to the noticing of legislative facts is a sufficient safeguard; Davis also presents
statistics indicating that a majority of "judicial notice situations" involve legislative facts. See Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 LAw & Soc.
ORDER 513, 525.
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volve reducing judicial notice to narrow confines within an adjudicative context.'6

B. Disputable and Indisputable Facts
The effect of the disputability of judicial notice may be considered from two perspectives. First, what type of fact may be noticed? Must a given fact be "not subject to reasonable dispute"
or may disputable extra-record facts also be noticed? Second,
what is the effect of taking judicial notice? Is the fact noticed
conclusive against all parties, or may the adverse party introduce
rebuttal evidence? The conflicting answers to these questions may
be summarized as follows:
1. Morgan's Conclusive Theory
Morgan argues that once the judge indicates that he will take
judicial notice of a fact, it is conclusively established and rebutting
evidence is inadmissible. 17 This theory follows from Professor
Morgan's premise that the purpose of judicial notice is to prevent
unnecessary litigation of moot issues, and therefore it should be
confined to indisputable questions of fact. Since the matter noticed is indisputably true, it cannot be rebutted and is conclusive
upon the jury. Professor McNaughton agrees that judicial notice
should be limited to indisputable facts, in order to eliminate the
necessity of proof where dispute is unlikely.' 8
2.

Wigmore's Challenge Theory

Wigmore takes the position that notice of a fact by the court
is not conclusive, and may be challenged by rebuttal evidence. 19
Therefore, a judge may notice facts other than those patently indisputable, because the adverse party may offer additional evidence. Professor Thayer argues that the "disputables" approach
is more convenient, speeds the conduct of the trial and lessens jury
confusion, by allowing the judge to notice many more facts. 20 No16. McCoRivmcK § 334.
17. Morgan, JudicialNotice, 57 HAv. L. Ray. 269 (1944).
18. McNaughton, Judicial Notice-Excerpts Relating to the Morgan-Wigmore Controversy, 14 VAND. L. REV. 779, 783 (1961). Accord, C. McCoRmcK, HANDBOOK OF TE LAW OF EVIDENCE: § 330 (1st ed. 1954).
The problem caused by the "conclusive" approach in the criminal
area is discussed infra § C.
19. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2571 (3d ed. 1940).
20. J. THAYER, A PRELIMIvNARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 308 (1898). Note
that proponents of the indisputable theory also argue that their approach saves trial time since the judge need not allow rebuttal evidence.
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tice of the generally "disputable" legislative facts should not pose
a problem under the "challenge" theory because the disputable
area admits contrary evidence. The same is not true under Morgan's theory, because the judge's notice of a legislative fact would
be conclusive. The Wigmore theory has been stated in various
ways; a court may simply say that the taking of judicial notice
eliminates the requirement of offering evidence by one of the par21
ties.
The Morgan-Wigmore controversy is one of procedure, not fact.
The Wigmore procedure allows the judge to notice facts which reasonable men would find notorious, subject to rebuttal evidence.
If the judge determines the fact noticed is not "notorious," he may
reverse his prior taking of judicial notice; the fact may then be
proved by the proponent's submission of evidence. 22 Under the
Morgan "indisputable" procedure, the judge must carefully determine that the fact is indisputable because his decision is final. Judicial notice has developed as a time-saving, procedural tool. As
applied to adjudicative facts, the "disputable" procedure is more
likely to complete this development by freeing the judge from23the
task of determining whether a particular fact is indisputable.
C.

Civil and Criminal Cases
A final problem area concerns the taking of judicial notice in
criminal cases. In general, the doctrine of judicial notice has developed without differentiation between civil and criminal cases.
Proponents of the "indisputable" approach concede, however, that
in criminal cases the jury must be left free to determine ultimately
the truth or falsity of an adjudicative fact. 24

Under Morgan's

"conclusive" theory, the adversary nature of criminal proceedings
is violated because the defendant may not test the propriety of
the noticed facts. If the jury is not allowed to weigh alternatives,
a conflict with the sixth amendment's right to trial by jury would
arise. 2

5

21. See, e.g., Piechota v. Rapp, 148 Neb. 442, 451-52, 27 N.W.2d 682, 688
(1947):
That a matter is judicially noticed means merely that it is
taken as true without the offering of evidence by the party
who should ordinarily have done so. 9 Wigmore, Evidence
(3rd ed.), § 2567, p. 535. It has no other effect than to relieve one of the parties of the burden of resorting to the usual
forms of evidence.
22. See Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience, in PERsPEcTiVES Or LAw 69 (1964).
23. See Comment, Judicial Notice and Presumptions Under the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 16 WAYNE L. REv. 135, 142 (1969).
24. McCoRIUCK § 332.
25. See generally, Comment, Judicial Notice in the Proposed Federal
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A similar problem arises when an appellate court takes judicial
notice in a criminal case. However, appellate courts have judicially
noticed facts without commenting on the constitutional difficulty.
For example, in Ross v. United States, 26 Judge

Blackmun judi-

cially noticed that social security checks are sent with instructions
to return them to the sender if the addressee is deceased; a conviction for obstruction of correspondence was affirmed. Similarly,
the Nebraska Supreme Court in Peterson v. State27 judicially noticed that beer and whiskey are intoxicants, without proof of that
fact; a conviction for possession of intoxicants was affirmed under
a complaint alleging possession of beer and whiskey.
Assuming that the facts noticed were indisputable, the defendant
nonetheless was denied the opportunity both to present opposing
evidence and to submit the issue to a jury. The United States
Supreme Court has held presumptions in criminal cases unconstitutional unless there is a rational connection between the fact proved
and the fact presumed.2 3 Presumably, at least that much is required with respect to judicial notice in a criminal case. Judicial
notice should be proper in a criminal case only if (1) the defendant
has been given an opportunity to present controverting evidence
and (2) the jury is instructed that the noticed fact is not conclusive
upon them.
III. PRIOR CODIFICATIONS
Both the Model Code of Evidence 29 and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence3 9 attempted to codify the doctrine of judicial notice. Their
respective solutions are summarized below.
A. The Model Code
The Model Code establishes three categories in which judicial
notice may be taken: (1) compulsory notice without request; 31 (2)
Rules of Evidence, 1969 WASH. L.Q. 453, 458. The constitutional argument is presented in Note, The Presently Expanding Concept of Judicial Notice, 13 VmL. L. REv. 528, 542-43 (1968).
26. 374 F.2d 97, 103 (8th Cir. 1967).
27. 63 Neb. 251, 254, 88 N.W. 549, 551 (1901).

28. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969).

For a summary of argu-

ments on both sides, see State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d
600 (1951) (majority and dissenting opinions). See also Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 LAw & Soc. ORDER 513, 519.
29. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE (1942) [hereinafter MODEL CODE].
30. UxNFomR RULEs OF EVIDENcE (1953) [hereinafter UNiFoRm RULEs].
31. MODEL CODE rule 801. Compulsory notice without request applies to
"such propositions of generalized knowledge as are so notorious as
not to be the subject of reasonable dispute."
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discretionary notice without request; 32 and (3) compulsory notice
on request.3 3 To be judicially noticed, a fact must be "so notorious
as not to be the subject of reasonable dispute" or be a "specific
fact or proposition of generalized knowledge" capable of accurate
verification by indisputable sources.3 4 The Model Code fails to distinguish between legislative and adjudicative facts, although the
phrase "proposition of generalized knowledge" has been interpreted
to apply to a judge's legislative function. 35 Since only indisputable
facts are recognized, the Model Code includes the corollary that
evidence in dispute of the noticed fact will not be allowed. 36 However, notice must be given to the adverse party so that party can
prepare to meet the request. 37 Civil and criminal cases are treated
alike, and the "conclusive" effect of judicial notice applies to both.
B. The Uniform Rules
The Uniform Rules provide for mandatory judicial notice for
"universally known facts which cannot reasonably be the subject
of dispute."3 8 Discretionary judicial notice applies to "generally
known facts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court, not
reasonably the subject of dispute," and to "specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge" that are capable of accurate determination by undisputable sources.3 9 The Uniform Rules copy
the Model Code's treatment of the "problem areas." No distinction
is made between legislative and judicial facts. 40 Only indisputable
facts are judicially noticed, so rebuttal evidence is not allowed. 41
The Morgan "conclusive" effect of taking judicial notice applies to
criminal and civil cases.
32. Id. rule 802.
33. Id. rule 803. The moving party must furnish the judge with sufficient information to enable him to properly comply with the request.
34. Id. rule 802.
35.

36.

PRop.

FED. R. Evm. 2-01, Advisory Committee's Note (Prelim. Draft

1969).
MODEL CODE rule

805.

37. Id. rule 803.
38. Usirom RuLE 9 (1).
39. Id. rule 9 (2). The rule requires a request, the furnishing of sufficient
information to the judge and notice to each adverse party.
40. Professor Davis has criticized both the Model Code and the Uniform
Rules for this failure: "My opinion is that the Model Code and the
Uniform Rules are fundamentally unsound in failing to recognize the
cardinal distinction between legislative facts and adjudicative facts."
Davis, A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness & Convenience,
in PERSPECTIVS OF LAw 69, 82 (1964).
41. Umxo~m RuLE 11.
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v. THE PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE
The drafters of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence (hereinafter "Federal Rule[s]" or "federal proposal") did not make any
major changes in the prior codifications of the law of judicial notice. The 1972 federal proposal 42 on judicial notice was adopted
without change by the drafters of the Proposed Nebraska Rules
of Evidence (hereinafter "Nebraska Rule[s]," "Nebraska proposal"
or "Rule[s]"). The drafters did not hesitate to take a stand; both
the Federal Rules and the Nebraska Rules present clear-cut answers to the problem areas of judicial notice.
A-

Scope of the Rule

The drafters first considered the legislative-adjudicative controversy. Rule 2-01(a) of the preliminary draft of the Federal Rules
read:
(a) SCOPE OF RULE. This rule governs judicial notice of
facts in issue or facts from which they may be inferred.
At -first blush, this Federal Rule appeared to cover both legislative and adjudicative facts, since a legislative fact may be a "fact
in issue." However, the Advisory Committee's Note indicated that
such was not the case-the rule was designed to deal only with
adjudicative facts. 43 Recognizing that the rule was unclear, 4 4 the
Advisory Committee amended the rule as follows:
(a) SCOPE OF RULE. This rule governs only judicial notice
of adjudicative facts.
Both the Federal Rule and the Nebraska Rule are therefore limited to adjudicative facts. 45 They provide no guidelines for the
42. Approved by United States Supreme Court on Nov. 20, 1972, and
submitted to Congress.
43. PROP. FED. R. EvID. 2-01(a), Advisory Committee's Note (Prelim.
Draft 1969).
44. See criticism in Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 LAw & Soc. Osn~m 513,
524.
45. The proposed rules specifically exclude any rules relating to judicial
notice of law; the Federal Advisory Committee's note in support of
the exclusion reads:
By rules effective July 1, 1966, the method of invoking
the law of a foreign country is covered elsewhere. Rule 44.1
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; Rule 26.1 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. These two new admirably
designed rules are founded upon the assumption that the
manner in which law is fed into the judicial process is never
a proper concern of the rules of evidence but rather of the
rules of procedure. The Advisory Committee on Evidence,
believing that this assumption is entirely correct, proposes no
evidence rule with respect to judicial notice of law, and sug-
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notice of legislative facts; nor do they provide any standards to
guide a judge in answering the threshold question of whether a
given fact is adjudicative or legislative. The Federal Advisory
Committee felt that "fundamental differences exist between adjudicative facts and legislative facts," and that the notice requirements imposed on adjudicative facts would be undesirable and un-

workable if imposed on notice of legislative facts; any restriction
upon a judge in his search for legislative facts is unwise, and this
view
renders inappropriate any limitation in the form of indisputability,
any formal requirements of notice other than those already inherent in affording opportunity to hear and be heard and exchanging
briefs, and any requirement of formal findings at any level. It
evidence
should, however, leave open the possibility of introducing
through regular channels in appropriate situations. 46

However, if Professor Davis is correct in his assertion that a
majority of facts judicially noticed are legislative, 47 it also seems
inappropriate to exclude this large category from formalized requirements of notice and opportunity to be heard. The Advisory
Committee's conclusion can best be understood in light of their
"indisputable" approach to the effect of judicial notice-an approach not well-suited to legislative facts. Under Rule 201 (a), then,
judges must look to existing law and practice for guidance when
judicially noticing legislative facts.
B. Kinds of Facts

The Rules follow well-established patterns with respect to the
kinds of facts subject to judicial notice. Following the lead of the
Model Code and the Uniform Rules, the disputable-indisputable
controversy is resolved by a "cautious approach," making only indisputable facts subject to judicial notice. The preliminary draft
of Federal Rule 2-01 (b) read:
(b) KINDS OF FACTS. A judicially noticed fact must be either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the
trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
gests the expansion of the Rules of Civil and Criminal Procedure to include those matters of law which, in addition to
foreign-country law, have traditionally been treated as requiring pleading and proof and more recently as the subject
of judicial notice ....
PROP. Fm. R. EviD. 2-01, Advisory Committee's Note on Judicial Notice
of Law (Prelim. Draft 1969). Current cases and statutes are therefore
controlling. For a synopsis of Nebraska judicial notice of law, see
D. Dow & J. NORTH, NEmRAsxA EVMNCE 3-7, 3-8 (State Bar, 1969).
46. Pmop. FD. R. Evm. 201, Advisory Committee's Note.
47. Note 15 supra.
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resort to sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably
questioned,
48
so that the fact is not subject to reasonable dispute.
The original draft was somewhat confusing because it appeared
that facts generally known under (1) were removed from the requirement of being "not subject to reasonable dispute." Such an
interpretation would be contrary to the complete "indisputable"
approach of the Rules. To eliminate this confusion, the final draft
of both the Federal Rule and the Nebraska Rule states:
(b) KINDS OF FACTS. A judicially noticed fact must be
one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.
The only significant departure from the Model Code and Uniform Rules is the absence of the "propositions of generalized
knowledge" category. The Advisory Committee explains:
The phrase "propositions of generalized knowledge," found in Uniform Rule 9(1) and (2) is not included in the present rule. It
was, it is believed, originally included in Model Code Rules 801
and 802 primarily in order to afford some minimum recognition
to the right of the judge in his "legislative" capacity (not acting
as the trier of fact) to take judicial notice of very limited categories of generalized knowledge. The limitations thus imposed
have been discarded herein as undesirable, unworkable, and contrary to existing practice. What is left, then, to be considered, is
the status of a "proposition of generalized knowledge" as an "adjudicative" fact to be noticed judicially and communicated by the
judge to the jury. 49
Thus viewed, it is considered to be lacking
practical significance.
C.

Procedural Matters

Procedural matters relating to judicial notice are considered in
the following subdivisions of Rule 201 in both the Federal and Nebraska proposals:
(c) WHEN DISCRETIONARY. A judge or a court may take
judicial notice, whether requested or not.
(d) WHEN MANDATORY. A judge or court shall take judicial notice if requested by a party and supplied with the necessary
information.
(e) OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD. A party is entitled upon
timely request to an opportunity to be heard as to the propriety
of taking judicial notice and the tenor of the matter noticed. In
the absence of prior notification, the request may be made after
judicial notice has been taken.
(f) TIME OF TAKING NOTICE. Judicial notice may be
taken at any stage of the proceeding.5 0
48. PRop. FzD. R. Evm. 2-01 (b) (Prelim. Draft 1969).
49. Pop. FEm. R. EviD. 201, Advisory Committee's Note.
50. The final draft of the Federal Rules, as approved by the United States
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Only one change has been made in the procedural subdivisions
from the preliminary federal draft. As originally written, subdivision (e) did not include the present final sentence covering a
hearing after notice has been taken.5 1 The preliminary draft was
criticized severely for this omission. 52 In the analogous area
of agency notice, the Administrative Procedure Act provides for
notice to parties after judicial notice has been taken.5 3 The United
States Supreme Court has held, in an agency case, that judicial
notice "does not mean that the opponent is prevented from disputing the matter by evidence if he believes it disputable." 54 In light
of these precedents, the final draft was amended and the Advisory
Committee's Note now reads in part:
An adversely affected party may learn in advance that judicial
notice is in contemplation, either by virtue of being served with
a copy of a request by another party under subdivision (d) that
judicial notice be taken, or through an advance indication by the
judge. Or he may have no advance notice at all. The likelihood
of the latter is enhanced by the frequent failure to recognize judicial notice as such. And in the absence of advance notice, a request made after the fact could not in fairness be considered untimely.5 5

The mandatory-discretionary division of the Rules is an improvement over the prior codifications. The Model Code and the Uniform Rules partially based the division on the type of fact being
noticed, which forced the judge to make an initial determination
on that point.56 The present rule bases the division solely on
whether a request has been made and necessary information furnished. Assuming such a request is made, either at the trial or
appellate level, 57 the judge would hold a hearing to determine
whether the fact was an adjudicative fact not subject to reasonable
dispute, and also the relevance and materiality of the fact to the
case. If an affirmative finding is made, the fact is judicially noticed and conclusive upon the jury.

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Supreme Court, was transmitted to Congress. In the House version
of the Rules, adopted by the House of Representatives on Feb. 6,
1974, the words "judge or" are eliminated from subdivisions (c) and
(d). H.R. 5463, 120 CONG. REc. H545-46 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
PRop. FED. R. Evm. 2-01 (e) (Prelim. Draft 1969).
See, e.g., Davis, JudicialNotice, 1969 LAw & SOC. ORDER 513, 519.
5 U.S.C. § 556(e) (1970).
Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 301 U.S. 292, 301-02 (1937).
PRop. FED. R. Evm. 201 (e), Advisory Committee's Note.
UmFom RuLEs 9(1), (2).
Rule 201 f) is in accord with Model Code rule 806 and Uniform Rule
12 in allowing an appellate court to judicially notice facts. See Armstrong v. Board of Supervisors, 153 Neb. 858, 46 N.W.2d 602 (1951).

344
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Effect of Judicial Notice

Since both the Federal Rule and the Nebraska Rule are limited
to indisputable facts, the logical corollary is a "conclusive" effect
to the taking of judicial notice. An unresolved problem, however,
is whether the conclusive effect applies to both civil and criminal
cases. The preliminary draft of the Federal Rules read:
(g)

INSTRUCTING JURY.

In civil jury cases, the judge

shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any facts judicially
noticed. In criminal jury cases, the judge shall instruct the jury
that it may but is not 58
required to accept as conclusive any fact
that is judicially noticed.
The Advisory Committee's Note justified the distinction between
civil and criminal cases by referring to the "considerations which
underlie the general rule that a verdict cannot be directed against
an accused:"
Criminal cases are treated somewhat differently in the rule.
While matters falling within the common fund of information supposed to be possessed by jurors need not be proved, .

.

. these

are not, properly speaking, adjudicative facts but an aspect of legal reasoning. The considerations which underlie the general rule
that a verdict cannot be directed against the accused in a criminal
case seems to foreclose the judge's directing the jury on the basis
of judicial notice to accept as conclusive any adjudicative facts in
the case ....
However, this view presents no obstacle to the
judge's advising the jury as to a matter judicially noticed, if he
instructs them that it need not be taken as conclusive. 59
Considering also the constitutional problems caused by the sixth
amendment's right to jury trial, the preliminary rule was an admirable solution to the problem. However, the Advisory Committee apparently had second thoughts. The final draft of the Federal Rule, which also was adopted by the Nebraska drafters, eliminates the distinction:
(g) INSTRUCTING JURY. The judge shall instruct the jury
to accept as established any facts judicially noticed.
The rationale for the change is explained as follows:
Authority upon propriety of taking judicative notice against an
accused in a criminal case with respect to matters other than
venue is relatively meager. Proceeding upon the theory that the
right of jury trial does not extend to matters which are beyond
reasonable dispute,
the rule does not distinguish between criminal
and civil cases.60
53. PRop. FED. R. Evm. 2-01 (g) (Prelim. Draft 1969).
59. PRop. FEu. R. Evm. 2-01(g), Advisory Committee's Note (Prelim. Draft
1969).
60. Pop. FFD. R. EvID. 201 (g), Advisory Committee's Note.
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No mention is made of the "considerations" against directed verdicts in criminal cases, and the sixth amendment is not discussed.
When the Federal Rule was submitted to the House Committee
on the Judiciary, Rule 201(g) was again amended to provide for
a civil-criminal distinction. The House of Representatives version
of the subdivision, passed on February 6, 1974, reads:
(g) INSTRUCTING JURY. In a civil action or proceeding,
the court shall instruct the jury to accept as conclusive any fact
judicially noticed. In a criminal case, the court shall instruct the

jury that it may, but 6is not required to, accept as conclusive any
fact judicially noticed. '

The Committee on the Judiciary's report on the amendment speaks
of the "spirit of the sixth amendment:"
Being of the view that mandatory instruction to a jury in a criminal case to accept as conclusive any fact judicially noticed is inappropriate because contrary to the spirit of the Sixth Amendment
right to a jury trial, the Committee adopted the 1969 Advisory
Committee draft of this subsection, allowing a mandatory instruca discretionary instruction in civil actions and
62 proceedings, and
tion in criminal cases.
The Federal Rule is currently in a state of flux, since the Senate

has not yet not addressed itself to the problem. If the final Federal Rule for jury instructions includes a civil-criminal distinction,
the Nebraska Rule 63would stand alone in applying the conclusive
effect in both cases.
V. CONCLUSION
Proposed Rule 201 should broaden the scope of judicial notice
in federal and state courts. Although limited to indisputable adjudicative facts, the Rule does not prevent the noticing of legislative facts. Trial time should be saved in civil cases under the "conclusive approach" because the judge need not consider rebuttal evidence; it is recommended that the conclusive effect of taking judicial notice not be applied to criminal cases.
The mere existence of Rule 201 will alert trial counsel to the
availability of the doctrine. Its formalized procedures for notice
-and hearing should allay the fears of some judges concerning the
61. H.R. 5463, 120 CONG. REc. H546, H570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974).
62. H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Congress, 1st Sess. 6-7 (1973).
63. The present Nebraska rule in any event changes existing Nebraska
law on adjudicative facts. Nebraska has followed the Wigmore "disputable" approach. See note 21 spra. Under the new Rule, no rebuttal evidence would be allowed once an adjudicative fact has been
judicially noticed.
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safeguards surrounding the rule. The doctrine of judicial notice
therefore should expand within the framework of Rule 201. The
result may be the development of judicial notice as envisioned by
Wigmore:
The doctrine of Judicial Notice contains the kernel of great possibilities, as yet not used, for improving trial procedure in the courts
of to-day....

The principle is an instrument of a usefullness

hitherto unimagined by judges. Let them make liberal use of it;
and thus avoid much of the needless failures of justice that are
caused by the artificial impotence of judicial proceedings. 64
64. 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2583 (3d ed. 1940).

